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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
OSCAR IVAN CORNEJO, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20050060-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Several points of law, all sufficient by themselves, support the trial court's 
decision to dismiss this case with prejudice. First, the case was a question of mixed fact 
and law, which demanded that the State put on all of its evidence at trial. The State came 
unprepared to do so. Secondly, continuing the trial would have represented an 
unconstitutional delay, in that a poor strategic decision on the case of the prosecutor was 
the reason for dismissal, and the Defendant was there, ready to proceed on all evidence. 
Third, the prosecutor was offered and refused the opportunity to bifurcate the charges and 
try the Driving Under the Influence with Priors charge separately, and Defendant waived 
his right to claim double jeopardy. Her refusal was unreasonable, and justified a 
dismissal. And finally, the Prosecutor attempted to manipulate the judge into dismissing 
with prejudice, as she was warned repeatedly that was the result, so that she could appeal 
and hopefully get a new trial, complete with the witness she failed to subpoena. 
Viewed in totality, the case was correctly dismissed with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
THE QUESTION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT WAS A MIXED 
QUESTION OF FACT AND LAW WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
HEARD BEFORE THE JURY. THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSED 
WITH PREJUDICE ONLY AFTER ACCEPTING THE STATE'S 
ASSERTION THAT THE DEFENSE STRATEGY WAS ACTUALLY 
A "MOTION TO SUPPRESS." HAD THE PROSECUTOR 
ALLOWED THE CASE TO GO TO TRIAL WITHOUT INSISTING 
UPON A DISMISSAL, ALL OF STATE'S EVIDENCE WOULD 
HAVE COME IN AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENSE STRATEGY. 
The State, while at the trial court level and in this appeal, has mischaracterized the 
issues in order to portray the dismissal as one in which the judge errantly dismissed a 
case. This case was not dismissed because the Defendant failed to raise a suppression 
issue in compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 12. The case was dismissed following an in-
chambers hearing which resulted in the judge's adopting the prosecutorial position that 
the defense strategy was really just a "Motion to Suppress." According to the State, the 
only real question for the court to examine was purely a legal issue of admissibility, 
which was a waived defense because it had not been raised in pre-trial proceedings. 
The court found that it was the state's burden to present evidence of admissibility, 
(Tr. 36:16 - 37:2), and since the State was characterizing the strategy as a "Motion to 
Suppress," the court would go ahead with a hearing on admissibility, prior to actually 
empaneling the jury. The court made this decision despite the fact the Defendant had 
failed to file an objection as to the admissibility of the evidence prior to the trial, as 
provided by Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1)(B). The court was within its authority to make 
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such a ruling, pursuant to Utah R. Crim P. 12(f), which allows the court to grant relief 
from compliance to the rule for good cause. 
The good cause in this case was the fact the Defendant intended to use, as his 
strategy, a showing to the jury that the arresting officer had engaged in several misdeeds 
which could lead to the jury's finding that police misconduct, not the Defendant's own 
behavior, was the animus for the arrest. The Defendant actually wanted the 
circumstances of the arrest and the blood draw to come in, and needed them to come in to 
illustrate his case. He then intended to object to them as part of his strategy, to lead the 
jury to the conclusion that the arresting officer was acting inappropriately at the time of 
the alleged drunken driving. 
Defendant articulated this strategy, and repeatedly objected to the prosecutor's 
assertion that it was a question of admissibility which was purely a legal issue reserved 
for the court to decide. (Tr. 8: 17-22, 17: 6-13, 18:8-22, 29:14-16, 46:15 to 47:25) 
In fact, the case, as counsel disclosed he intended to defend it, was a mixed 
question of fact and law. The facts should have been heard at the trial, and then decided 
upon by the judge as for admissibility. The Defendant's strategy was to ask, 
substantively, "Was this entire arrest motivated by the Defendant's behavior, or by 
inappropriate police behavior? (Tr. 10:19-11:14, 26:19- 27:5, 46:15 - 47:15, 52:7-13.) 
The judge adopted the position of the prosecution, reducing the question to one of law, 
"Are the toxicology reports properly admissible because they were properly obtained?" 
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(Tr. 11:16.) 
The Utah Supreme Court indicated in State of Utah v. Shayne M. Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, 659 (2005) that mixed questions of fact and law are examined 
giving some discretion to the district court's application of the law. The discretion 
afforded varies, however, according to the issue being reviewed. When a case involves 
consent to search, the appellate court will afford little discretion to the district court, 
because there must be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial 
officials (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993)). 
The state-wide standards for a search and seizure are the benchmark from which 
the Defendant wanted to work, having the evidence of the stop come in, and letting the 
jury decide if the search was driven by improper motives. The court could still have 
decided that the search was unconstitutional, and stricken all of the evidence from the 
record. Without hearing all of the factual evidence, though, the court could not have 
applied the facts to the law and made an appropriate determination. Hansen, at 660, 
articulates that 
To determine whether a traffic stop was reasonable, we consider two 
questions: "(1) Was the police officer's action justified at its inception? And 
(2) Was the resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place?" (quoting 
State v. Lopez, 873 P. 2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994)). 
Looking at this test, the prosecutor failed to subpoena the police officer who could 
lay the foundation for the search and seizure of the blood which led to the toxicology 
-4-
reports. Without that testimony, part one of the reasonableness test could not be proven. 
Prosecutorial error prevented the judge from making any other decision when he decided 
to dismiss the case. 
The Defendant has no disagreement with the state as to whether an impromptu 
suppression hearing should have been held, as it was unreasonable to demand that the 
prosecutor present her evidence in such a hearing. 
The parmount issue is, though, that there was no need for a suppression hearing, as 
the Defendant did not want anything suppressed. The State argues, at page 22 of its brief, 
that a strategic decision should not be the basis for "cause" to excuse the latter challenge 
pursuant to Rule 12(f). This argument must also fail, because the Defendant made no 
strategic decision to challenge Rule 12(f). He wanted all of the evidence to come in. The 
prosecutor initially agreed with that position. The prosecutor conceded the strategic 
defense planned by the Defendant was appropriate, when the prosecutor stated 
And I think if he's going to suggest that there's something improper, which 
he may very well be able to do as a factual matter in front of a jury, I ought 
to be able to defend it by saying this is exactly (unintelligible)- (emphasis 
added)(Tr. 8:12-16.) 
The defense strategy required, as proof, all of the surrounding circumstances 
related to the blood draw to come into the trial. The objection as to the admissibility 
which the Defendant planned to make would have been a moot point-as the matter would 
have already been heard by the jury. The court could have immediately overruled any 
i 
objection by the Defense, as at least two witnesses-the sergeant of the arresting officer, 
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and the state's toxicologist, would have already provided a foundation for the evidence, 
and would have been cross-examined by the Defense. Certainly at that point-and as was 
articulated by the defense counsel in chambers prior to trial-the Defendant would have 
waived any objection to the evidence being heard because counsel would not have 
objected to the witnesses. 
In light of the Defendant's position, the trial court correctly insisted that the 
prosecution be responsible for providing an evidentiary foundation for any evidence 
which came in-regardless of whether or not there was an objection to such evidence. (Tr. 
36:16-37:2.) Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does not indicate that 
failure to object to evidence by the Defendant permits the State to ignore the Rules of 
Evidence. The Rules of Evidence exist to ensure the triers of fact and law receive a 
proper foundation for proper conclusions based upon the evidence. 
The prosecutor incorrectly assessed the question before the court, after already 
conceding the Defendant had a right to defend his case as he planned. The prosecutor and 
the trial court wrongly determined the defense was actually a "Motion to Suppress." The 
judge believed the issue should go forward, with the State having the burden to produce 
evidence to prove its stop, search, and seizure were all proper and not motivated by 
inappropriate police behavior. As it were, as the prosecution was missing a link in its 
evidentiary chain, the judge had no choice but to dismiss with prejudice. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
DELAY WAS CORRECT. REGARDLESS OF HOW PAST 
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CONTINUANCES ARE VIEWED, THE DEFENDANT WAS 
PREPARED TO GO TO TRIAL, HAD SUFFERED THE 
EMOTIONAL AND FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE 
PREPARATION, AND THE PROSECUTOR WAS SIMPLY 
UNPREPARED TO PUT ON HER EVIDENCE. 
The State makes a well-delivered presentation of the reason that any further delay 
in the trial would not have been unconstitutional. However, its argument rests on the idea 
that any further delay would be the Defendant's fault, because the "...defendant failed to 
timely challenge the admission of his involuntary blood draw by September 1..." (Br. 17.) 
This argument must fail because it is simply a fallacious representation of what 
occurred. At no point in the record is there any evidence that the Defendant wanted a 
suppression hearing. As explained above, the Defendant wanted the case to go forward, 
and have all of the police behavior be put before the jury. It was the prosecutor and the 
judge who termed the issue one of admissibility, and thus a suppression issue. (Tr. 5:13 -
7:21,8:17.) 
Defendant agrees that the question of whether an unconstitutional delay has 
occurred must be viewed by the totality of the circumstances. While Defendant does 
concede that there was no objection to delays in the pre-trial process, a reading of the 
marshalled record does indicate that the delays were domino-in-effect, because the 
Weber County Attorney's office failed to deliver the tape of the arrest in a timely matter. 
Whether Attorney Chad McKay had to continue hearings till he got past Scout Camp is 
not the point. The point is that the continuances were necessary because the schedule got 
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off in the first place when the tape was not delivered to the defendant, and the County 
Attorney's office did not immediately determine which charges it would file. Attorney 
Mckay would have been prepared to go forward as scheduled had the County not started 
with the processing of fouling up the schedule. 
Demanding that the Defendant would have objected to delays in the pre-trial, in 
order to demonstrate unconstitutional delay, necessarily demands that Defendant could 
have anticipated what would happen when he got to the court for his scheduled trial. The 
Supreme Court said, "We reject, therefore, the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a 
speedy trial forever waives his right." Barker v. Wingo, Warden, 407 U.S. 514 at 528 
(1972). Defendant's actions were to cooperate with continuances needed because the 
County Attorney did not quickly decide which charges should be filed and did not deliver 
the arrest tape. The continuances should not be construed against the Defendant. They 
should be viewed as supportive of his belief that a speedy trial would be provided. 
Defendant had no reason to object to earlier delays, because he had no reason to suspect 
that the prosecutor would come to the trial unprepared. 
The cases upon which the State relies for support of its position on its 
unreasonable delay/unavailable witness arguments can be largely distinguished. The 
State uses Barker v. Wingo, Warden, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to support its assertion that 
unavailability of a witness is not a reason for unconstitutional delay. What the State fails 
to mention is that the witness in Barker was planning to come, was subpoenaed, and 
-8-
developed an unforeseen illness which prevented his coming. Barker at 518. In the case 
at bar, the witness was never subpoenaed to come to trial, because the prosecutor believed 
his presence was unnecessary. In fact, she had never even talked to the "unavailable" 
witness before that date. (Tr. at 33:19-23). 
Similarly, in State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990), the situation again was 
that the unavailable witness was the victim, who had been subpoenaed to appear. Trafny 
consented to the continuance requested by the State because of the unavailable witness. 
There was no consent to a continuance in this case. l 
The term "unavailable" is not interpreted so broadly as to say that it covers 
witnesses who were never ordered to show up. Interpretation as such would allow any 
prosecutor to fail to subpoena a witness and then move for a continuance-which would be 
taking advantage of a "strategic decision." The state admits that a "strategic decision" 
should not be grounds for a dismissal, and should not as such be grounds for a 
continuance. (Br. at 22.) 
This Court should apply URE 804 (Hearsay), as a guideline for when a witness is 
"unavailable," and compare it to the circumstances surrounding the prosecutor's 
unavailable witness. The unavailable witness exemptions which would apply should be 
JIt is conceded however, that a second trial date was set, another witness was 
subpoenaed, and was unavailable. Trafny objected to a continuance, and the trial court 
did dismiss without prejudice. Other circumstances following the dismissal differ enough 
that this second delay is incomparable to the case in considering whether an 
unconstitutional delay was committed. Trafny at 705. 
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one of the following, as per rule 804: 
The unavailable witness should be... 
1. Exempted by a rule of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying. 
2. Persists in refusing to testify, despite an order of the court to do so. 
3. Testifies as to a lack of memory of the subject matter. 
4. Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then 
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. 
None of the four conditions above apply to the State's unavailable witness. Rule 
804 also provides that the witness is "not unavailable" as a witness if the absence is due 
to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the statement for the purpose of 
preventing the witness from attending or testifying. 
In this case, the witness's lack of attendance was solely because of the failure of 
procurement of the proponent of the testimony-the prosecutor's. The state had no 
intention of having the witness testify. This error should be construed against the State, 
and not against the Defendant. The trial court was justified in dismissing the case with 
prejudice, as the State caused its own problems. The Defendant was there, prepared to 
go to trial with all of the evidence against him. 
THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT ARGUE WITH THE 
PROSECUTOR'S POSITION THAT ORDINARILY, BIFURCATION 
OF CRIMINAL CHARGES STEMMING FROM A SINGLE 
CRIMINAL EPISODE WOULD BE IMPLAUSIBLE AND CREATE 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR THE DEFENDANT, IN THIS CASE, 
HOWEVER, DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CLAIM 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY BY NOT OBJECTING TO THE TRIAL 
JUDGE'S OFFER TO BIFURCATE THE ISSUES AND ALLOW 
TWO TRIALS. 
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The transcript of the proceedings on the date of the trial indicate that the trial judge 
offered the prosecutor the opportunity to bifurcate the charges against the Defendant, and 
allow her to proceed later with the Driving Under the Influence with Priors charge. (Tr. 
52:20 - 54:25) The Defendant agrees that normally this would constitute double jeopardy. 
The transcript is also very clear that Attorney Chad McKay never objected to the 
court's offer of bifurcation. The failure to object constituted a waiver of the Defendant of 
the double jeopardy argument. Such a waiver is permitted under Barker, which defines 
waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 
Barker at 525, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Defense counsel's 
professional decision to not object represented a clear waiver of the double jeopardy 
argument. 
Because the Defendant waived his double jeopardy right, the State could have 
proceeded with two trials. The State declined its right to do so, and as such, waived its 
right to appeal the dismissal with prejudice. 
THE PROSECUTOR ATTEMPTED TO STRONG-ARM THE 
JUDGE. SHE WAS GIVEN AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO 
RECONSIDER HER POSITION TO NOT GO FORWARD WITH 
HER CASE. SHE STIPULATED TO THE DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE. 
Several times throughout the pre-trial proceedings, Prosecutor 
Brenda Beaton was told that if she moved to dismiss the case, the case 
would be dismissed with prejudice. (Tr. at pages 39, 40, 42, 55, 56.) She 
essentially "dared" the judge to dismiss the case with prejudice, knowing 
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she could appeal the issue, as the State has done. Such was a strategic 
decision in error on her part, and should not now be a basis for remanding 
the case back for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Because she failed to subpeona her own witness, because she declined the 
opportunity to bifurcate the charges, and because she utterly failed to just go to trial with 
the witnesses and case she had prepared, which very easily could have led to convictions 
on all counts, this Court must view her actions as a stipulation to the judge's Dismissal 
with prejudice. This case should remain dismissed, and not be remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted October 28, 2005 
ChaaB. Mckay 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing brief of 
Defendant/Appelle were delivered by hand delivering or mailing to CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS,, 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
DATED this C\A day of_ 
LAUREN TREJO 
Legal Assistant 
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of time and you can argue that that prejudices his case, but 
that's the way the statute reads, you know, so -- if you 
don't resolve it in some manner then I don't know how to tell 
this jury what they're doing. Otherwise, I tell them this is 
a felony DUI but we are asking you only to determine whether 
or not there's a basic violation of the DUI law in so --
MR. MCKAY: Yes. It's my understanding that we had 
agreed that -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- and that's why 
I didn't have any problems with these -- this verdict form is 
that I think you even sent over an instruction that if they 
find him guilty of the DUI, that we will send them back into 
the room to find the other elements and basically will be 
certified but it's (unintelligible) --
THE COURT: Well, it's a -- it's a legal question if 
you want make it such or I can send it back. You see, 
they -- if I take it from the jury, it has to be clearly 
agreed that I can do that part of it separate from the jury. 
Otherwise, I have to give it to the jury. I don't have any 
choice. 
MR. MCKAY: Well, I don't think there's much 
question but — 
THE COURT: 
MR. MCKAY: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MCKAYS 
Well, it's up to you. 
— to prove that part of it so •— 
Chad, it's up to you to decide so 
I have --
5 
MS. BEATON: I think the other -- the other issue 
is, is there1s a forced blood draw in this case, and the 
forced blood draw was done because the defendant had six 
priors within 10 years and he had just evaded the police and 
they felt like it was an emergency situation. So they did --
THE COURT: This is not a regular test? 
MS, BEATON: No. This was an initial refusal and 
then they are telling him we're going to force the blood draw 
then, and then he -- I mean, he does stick out his arm and 
they don't have to hold him down or do anything, you know. 
MR. MCKAY: I'm going to argue a bunch of stuff on 
that so — 
MS. BEATON: But so I think if he's going to 
argue it --
THE COURT: Well, that a — that's going to be 
argued as a legal issue? 
MR. MCKAY: Yeah. I'm not -- at least -- nothing is 
perfect but I'm going to try not to bring up that 
information. I'm just going to go through the procedures and 
policies, whether they followed them, on cross. That's --
MS. BEATON: And I think the problem is if there's a 
suggestion by defense counsel that they improperly forced the 
blood draw — 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. BEATON: Because this jury is going to think, 
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draw. You had another motion but it didn't affect that blood 
draw at all. 
MR, MCKAY: Well, we brought it up in the prelim. 
You know, maybe Ifm not understanding. 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. MCKAY: Are you talking about the supression 
hearing? 
THE COURT: At the supression hearing — 
MS. BEATON: Wait. Do you — 
THE COURT: -- it was never brought up. 
MR. MCKAY: Right. We were just saving it for 
trial. That doesn't — 
THE COURT: Well, but it's a legal question as to 
whether or not the blood draw is proper. You see, if he had 
had an opportunity to take a test, that legally can come in, 
if he refuses. There's a -- I think a very stat -- a clear 
statutory provision that you can just mention that he 
refused, basically. But if you're going to contest the 
validity of the blood draw, that is not a jury question. 
That is a judge question. 
MR. MCKAY: Yeah. All I'm saying is that — 
THE COURT: And so it would have to be heard outside 
the hearing of the jurors, and this is a heck of a time to be 
bringing it up. 
MS. BEATON: And frankly, the state's in a position 
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instruct them that the blood draw is legal, basically, that 
you know, would be the ultimate conclusion, if I determine it 
is a legal blood draw. 
MR. MCKAY: I guess it's just — 
THE COURT: I don't know -- I haven't reviewed the 
case that authorizes it for a long, long time. I know there 
are some very limited circumstances where they can draw blood 
from a DUI suspect where he's in an emergency room as a 
result of an accident, for example, I think there are some 
cases that have held they can draw there for medical 
purposes, and then it can be used for a DUI process, but the 
exceptions are pretty limited, as I recall. 
Brenda, what is your take on what the law allows in the 
way of a blood draw? 
MS. BEATON: Bill has this issue right now and he 
and I have been talking about this issue. State versus 
Rodriguez is the case that defines whether or not a blood 
draw can be taken in an instance like this. Because what 
they did in Rodriguez was, they forced a blood draw of a 
woman who had refused all the field sobrieties and all the 
same sort of circumstances that we're dealing with here 
although they didn't have an evading that proceeded it and 
the Court then lists all these different factors. And I 
guess my problem is I — 
THE COURT: But it was a forced blood draw on that 
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improperly taken and I can give three specific reasons why it 
was improperly taken, and then just let them be the judges 
and the trier of fact on the — it's a very factually-based 
issue. I don't think it's a legal issue — 
THE COURT: But that's giving the jury the right to 
make the legal decision on whether it's admissible. If you 
are willing to let that jury consider the results of a blood 
draw as part of your strategy in this case and then argue 
that, you know, they shouldn't give it any real weight 
because of all the circumstances, which is what you'd like to 
do, you're going to have to weigh that legal question as to 
the admissibility. Otherwise, I'm going to insist that it be 
resolved outside the hearing of the jury on a basis of a 
legal question. If you want to let it in --
MR. MCKAY: Well, you — 
THE COURT: -- and then raise the problem, you lose 
the right to appeal the admissibility of that evidence and 
you can only argue to the jury then what weight do you want 
to give it. But admissibility is a legal question and if you 
want to give up your argument that it was illegally drawn so 
you can argue that, you know, the oppressive police conduct, 
the overzealous police work that was being done against your 
client to his detriment, or whatever your theory is, which I 
understand is basically that based on your previous — you 
know, the previous motion that I denied, then, you know, 
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to — 
not --
MR. MCKAY: Whether they followed the procedures or 
THE COURT: -- to get some evidence — 
MR. MCKAY: It shows his intent — 
THE COURT: Yeah. You might be able to get some 
evidence in on it. But as far as admissibility of a test, 
it's a legal question. The statute makes certain provisions 
on how the Court can admit the results of a test that is 
through the intoxalyzer or, you know, the blood alcohol 
testing equipment that is used. 
MR. MCKAY: Maybe I don't understand. Are you 
saying that that's an option that they not? If I say that I 
waive that and they not present that evidence. How do they 
prove their case without that evidence? Maybe I'm just not 
understanding what you're saying. 
MS. BEATON: The judge is suggesting that 
(unintelligible) --
THE COURT: Well, I am saying that it's not a jury 
question as to the admissibility of that test, and therefore, 
it has to be decided by a judge outside the hearing of the 
jury. If I allow it in, then all of the circumstances are 
probably going to be coming in. If I deny it, then if you 
raise the issue, you may open the door for them to get it in 
in certain ways — 
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came back, I've given him notice of expert, I've sent over 
CVs, I've done all sorts of things to indicate to him at 
least what my game plan was. 
He and I have talked a few different times, and until 
today is the first time hearing that now all of a sudden 
we're going to talk about forced blood draw and we're going 
to, you know, make it seem like it's a big deal and all --
THE COURT: Well --
MS. BEATON: — this kinda thing. 
THE COURT: — I'm not so concerned about the 
forcing of the blood draw and all of that if there is no 
objection to the test coming in. If there is an objection to 
the test coming in, that's a legal question I have to decide 
outside the presence of the jury, and the jury doesn't need 
to hear all the circumstances of it, then I would have to 
decide that. It doesn't sound like we're ready to go the 
jury on that issue for sure. 
If you're going to object to the admissibility of the 
test, then I'm going to have to have a special hearing or I'm 
going to have to fully hear this and review the law because, 
you know, in our society in general you don't force people to 
give blood to incriminate them criminally, unless you're 
under one of the exceptions for a DNA draw or for some of the 
other purposes that are permitted. And a person can refuse 
to take the test and then I instruct them that there was a 
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MR. MCKAY: -- it's not like this is new. 
THE COURT: We're only talking about — 
MR. MCKAY: You knew this was coming --
THE COURT: We're only talking about the blood 
alcohol. 
MS. BEATON: But the bottom line is we don't have a 
trial today if you're going to object to the illegal 
admissibility of the blood draw because that isn't something 
that we just parade out in front of a jury. That's something 
that we all get to write briefs on. That's something that if 
the Court rules against the state I think may be an 
appealable issue for me, it might be an appealable issue for 
you to go up on. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I'm -- I'm not going to just go 
and give that whole thing to the jury and then try to 
instruct them what's admissible and what isn't. 
MR. MCKAY: Yeah. And I guess I see it differently. 
MS. BEATON: And maybe this whole conversation 
needs --
THE COURT: And that's what you apparently assumed I 
would do --
MS. BEATON: — (unintelligible) is mute then 
because the defendant (unintelligible) show up. 
MR. MCKAY: Yeah. I mean, my whole case is based 
on — 
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THE CLERK: I don't know « 
MS. BEATON: And I don't know how that — 
THE COURT: Mr. Cornejo isn't going anywhere. Hell, 
he's been around long enough to get seven DUIs, you say? 
MS. BEATQN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: He's going to stick around. 
MS. BEATON: It's the Christmas season, he'll 
probably be drunk and driving again. State wants a bench 
warrant if he doesn't show at the time of trial. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll give Mr. McKay time to get 
him in for sure if he has to go pick him up. 
MS. BEATON: Well, isn't today D-Day, though? I 
mean, he doesn't know that we've got — 
MR. MCKAY: As far as I know --
THE COURT: I'll decide that issue if we decide — 
is he in there now -- I don't know. 
MR. MCKAY: We got to change this screen. 
THE COURT: But you know, I'm going to -- I'm going 
to give Mr. McKay a chance to get him in before I have him 
arrested. He's shown up for his other hearings. 
THE CLERK: The defendant is here. 
THE COURT: He is? 
THE CLERK: He is. 
THE COURT: So it's a nonissue there. But we're 
going to have to address this other issue. We got a couple 
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the presence of a jury given the fact that it may deny the 
evidence and then that leaves the state with one element that 
they would have to determine if they're going to try and 
prove, and that is if the defendant was impaired so that he 
could not safely operate a motor vehicle under the statute 
and get a conviction. 
So the admissibility of the blood test is a critical 
element of the state's case. And the state has indicated 
they had previously given notice to Mr. McKay they intended 
to put that in and they have their — what is it a doctor 
lined up --
MS. BEATON: Toxicologist. 
THE COURT: -- or a technician, a toxicologist to 
come in and testify about, I suppose, the blood draw and the 
test itself. 
MS. BEATON: And the result. 
THE COURT: And the results and asserting that there 
is a blood alcohol level above the .08 grams, I suppose. 
So that being the case, the state -- or the Court has a 
jury ready to go. Mr. McKay has indicated off the record, 
and I want to make it a part of the record now that he is 
ready to go to trial, his client is here and he wishes to go 
to trial today on the issue and the state has objected to 
going to trial today until the legal question of 
admissibility by them can be resolved. And I'd like to hear 
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prepared its entire case on the premise that that evidence 
would be included as testimony rather than we would have an 
issue in front of the jury as to its admissibility. 
The state's position is, is that if we're going to argue 
this legal issue it's not something that can be readily done 
this morning and then reconvene the jury this afternoon; one, 
because research needs to be done by all three of the parties 
involved in this; two, because it requires an evidentiary 
hearing that requires the state to subpoena witnesses, some 
of which have already been subpoenaed for the trial but 
others of which the state would anticipate calling who are 
not under subpoena by the state and whether or not their 
availability is — it is unknown at this point in time; 
three, I think the state's position is, is that this is an 
appealable issue, possibly by defense if the Court permits 
the admissibility of the forced blood draw in and the 
results; or two, that it would be situational possibly the 
state could appeal this issue because it i's so critical for 
determining the DUI in this particular case. 
The state also feels like this is a situation where the 
law does not permit defense counsel or the state to conduct a 
trial by ambush. And we have had a preliminary hearing, 
we've had a pretrial and we've had a supression hearing, all 
of which none of those have indicated to the state that 
defense counsel was going to object to this blood draw until 
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filed, it was brought up at the preliminary hearing, it was 
not contested at the supression hearing and not mentioned as 
any point of contention at any of the pretrials. And today 
the state was first informed by Mr. McKay that this was going 
to be an issue right as we were standing out in the hallway 
prior to the jury coming in. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. McKay, would you like to 
make a record and your -- regarding your position in this 
matter. 
MR. MCKAY: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. Throughout 
this proceeding it's been fairly informal discovery. We've 
cooperated, passed things back and forth. We haven't had 
formal cut-off dates, we haven't had formal lists that have 
gone out, we haven't even supplied each other with witness 
lists. I mean, it's been very informal. Proper notice is 
not required in this case. Because for me to -- and as the 
Court knows, I'm not required to show all of my case to the 
prosecution, basically write out here, this is everything I'm 
going to do, you go ahead and prepare a response to every 
single thing, that's just not what the law requires. 
The fact that in fact she sent the discovery to me that 
she brought up, particularly what she's referring to are the 
procedures for a forcible blood draw shows that it did come 
up in the preliminary hearing — in fact, I don't think she 
was the one that did the prelim, I think it was Camille. 
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the legal issue that the Court will rule on, but did he 
follow the procedures, and I believe the trier of facts can 
follow those points, yes or no. And that's -- you know, we 
believe he did violate them on at least three particulars but 
it's up to the Court to rule whether that's --
One other thing, and maybe this is just a legend that 
passes around among the defense bar, but most defense 
attorneys --my brother was a prosecutor and a judge and 
they, at least in Arizona, prosecutors will not try cases 
during December because they believe jurors for the will of 
the season or whatever it is are more lenient. And for that 
matter --
MS, BEATON: Now wait a minute. 
MR. MCKAY: — it would be prejudicial to my client 
not to have the trial in the month of December but to bump it 
off to when all the debts hit in February. 
THE COURT: Well --
MS. BEATON: 
MR. MCKAY: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MCKAY: 
argument --
THE COURT: 
MR. MCKAY: 
That's a bunch of crap. J 
Whether it carries weight or not --
Just a minute. Just a minute. J 
— I'm just telling you that's an 1 
Yeah. That's — that's — 
-- that it does tend to -- I mean, 
prosecutors don't think about it but — 
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their credit card debt it doesn't matter. 
MR. MCKAY: Or that they need to be shopping instead 
of here listening to the case. 
THE COURT: Yeah. And we're far enough before 
Christmas that it's — it's totally a nonfactor. 
However, I do think it's an important legal issue, that 
is my -- that's my concern on Ms. Beaton's side, it is an 
important legal issue. Strategically I understand where you 
were coming -- are coming from and it isn't your obligation 
totally to object in advance through motions in limine. The 
problem is as a judge in managing the trial, I have to make 
sure that it's done right and that the proper evidence gets 
before the jury and the improper evidence doesn't get before 
the jury. It's a question of law as to whether or not under 
certain facts a blood draw is permitted and then the evidence 
obtained therefrom can be used by the prosecution. 
I have to also factor in how difficult it is for me to 
find trial dates for two days even, you know, to get cases 
tried because we're heavily calendared and we've set aside 
this date for the jury trial and I don't like to give up my 
trial dates. I have to use as many days for the trials as I 
can. I'm going to rule as follows: 
We're going ahead with this trial today and I'm going to 
excuse the jury until 1:30, we're going to have a hearing on 
the legal and factual issues relating to this. It's now 
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MS. BEATON: When are we going to have the 
evidentiary hearing? 
THE COURT: Right now, 
MR. MCKAY: Do we need to go over the instructions? 
THE COURT: Not now. 
MR. MCKAY: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm going to excuse the jury for --
until 1:30, have them come back and then we're going to go 
ahead and try this case. 
(The following was held in open court.) 
THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury panel, 
you've been summoned in today to hear a case that is going to 
go for today and tomorrow, a criminal case. And we have 
determined -- or I have determined this morning that there 
are some issues that are purely legal that I need to resolve 
with the parties before we actually proceed with the trial. 
Now, that being the case, I'm going to take the rest of 
this morning to resolve those legal questions that exist. 
And I'm going to have the jury panel come back at 1:30 and we 
will proceed with the trial. We still should be able to be 
done by tomorrow evening. 
Now, the only question I'm going to ask any of you right 
now is are there any of you who have a -- an extremely dire 
emergency of some sort that would prevent you from being 
involved with the court for the next two days? Other issues 
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Honor, I think you've already heard what the state's position 
is. That's the problem that we're having here. The state 
feels like it's not prepared, this is an issue that the 
Court's already indicated it's not prepared for so I don't 
know why --
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to reargue that 
issue. I just want to know how many witnesses you're going 
to need to call, who they are and let's see if we can help 
you to get them here as soon as possible. 
MS. BEATON: Well, I need two witnesses right now, 
one witness who is not even under subpoena which is the 
sergeant who authorized this. 
THE COURT: Well, that one perhaps I can allow in 
through a hearsay basis but let's -- the other witness, when 
were they due? 
MS. BEATON: Well, the other witness obviously is 
going to be the trooper. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. BEATON: So he's here. But problem is that the 
state has is I don't know what the — I haven't even had a 
discussion with Brad Home as to what the mental thoughts 
were that he was having when he instructed Trooper Jones to 
make sure that a forced blood draw takes place. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. BEATON: But troo — but Sergeant Home is the 
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THE CLERK: For the record we'll call State of Utah 
versus Oscar Ivan Cornejo, case number 041900798, 
THE COURT: All right. The state may proceed. 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, if I may, the — I have 
pulled the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. BEATON: Rule 12 under motions. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. BEATON: It indicates the following shall be 
raised at least five days prior to trial, this is subsection 
C, sub 1, sub B, which indicates that, A motion to suppress 
evidence shall be -- shall be brought before the court at 
least five days prior to trial. Subsection A indicates, An 
application to a court for an order shall be by motion, 
which, unless made during the trial or hearing, shall be in 
writing and in accordance with this rule. A motion shall 
state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon 
which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not be 
accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the Court. 
The state's position is, is that this motion has -- is 
requesting a supression of evidence of the admissibility of 
the blood draw and it should have been raised at least five 
days prior to trial and has not been raised five days to 
trial. The state is not prepared to go forward today and is 
not prepared on this legal issue. 
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THE COURT: Itfs your burden, not the defensefs 
burden to be certain that the evidence is admissible. 
MS. BEATON: Well, even if it's my burden, under 
this scenario, Rule 12 required me to file something in 
writing which I have not done, which I am prepared to do. 
THE COURT: Well, that's not the way I read it so 
you can go ahead and --
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, at this time the state 
moves to dismiss. 
THE COURT: Denied. This jury is here to try this 
case. 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, with all due respect — 
THE COURT: If I dismiss -- let me say, I may 
admit -- I may allow that but it would be with prejudice. 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, I've also --
THE COURT: We're ready to go to trial. 
MS. BEATON: -- looked at that. Rule 25 indicates 
the dismissal without trial, when that can be done and 
whether or not it can be done with prejudice. The only 
option that would apply is whether or not the Court believes 
that there is unconstitutional delay in bringing the 
defendant to trial. And I believe as we've indicated early I 
don't think that the Court can make a finding that the state 
is trying to delay this matter for no reason. 
The state wants to be prepared on this legal issue 
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defense counsel did not bring that issue at the supression 
hearing. 
THE COURT: Nor did the state ever bring it before 
the Court. 
MS. BEATON: I agree. 
THE COURT: We're going to go to trial today, that's 
denied. 
MS, BEATON: Your Honor --
THE COURT: If I dismiss it, it would have to be 
upon your agreement to dismiss with prejudice, I can do that. 
MS. BEATON: I think the one thing that I get to do 
is I get to dismiss this case if I want to as part of the 
executive branch. The Court has the liberty then to 
determine if it's going to be a dismissal with prejudice but 
the state would ask for findings that it's being made based 
on unconstitutional delay. 
THE COURT: It isn't. I'm just -- well, it could 
possibly be. But I -- what I'm saying is the parties are 
here, ready for trial, you should be prepared to go to trial 
today and you've had ample notice of this trial date. And I 
am — the defense has mentioned in chambers they want the 
trial today, they're here ready to go, and so we'll either 
have the trial today or you can move to dismiss it without 
prejudice -- or with prejudice. 
MS. BEATON: I — with all due respect to the Court, 
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may present the evidence concerning this blood draw and I'll 
make a decision on whether it's admissible. 
MS. BEATON: But I think what the Court — what the 
state is saying, your Honor, is the state is not prepared to 
make this legal argument today. Because if the Court denies 
the admissibility of this evidence — 
THE COURT: That's your problem, Ms. Beaton, not 
mine. 
MS. BEATON: I — 
THE COURT: I have to rule correctly on it no 
matter what. 
MS. BEATON: I agree. And I think that you will 
rule correctly on it but I want -- I want the ability to at 
least file a written motion to indicate to you why I think 
that this evidence is admissible. I also have a difficulty 
because the sergeant who authorized this is on his way to 
Soda Springs, Idaho where he has business, where he — 
THE COURT: I would be very liberal in you 
presenting any evidence concerning the circumstances of 
this — 
MS. BEATON: I understand that, your Honor — 
THE COURT: — blood draw. 
MS. BEATON: — but I really feel like the state is 
not prepared to go forward. 
THE COURT: And so what are you going to do? Do you 
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is this Court's dealing with the admissibility of the test 
that was blood drawn after the defendant refused to give a 
test, is that correct, Ms. Beaton? The defendant refused to 
give a test when — after he had been stopped and arrested? 
MS. BEATON: He did. 
THE COURT: And the facts as I was told in 
chambers — and by the way, I have never been asked to review 
the record of the preliminary hearing, because the only thing 
I was asked to review was the videotape of the officer when I 
denied your motion to suppress, so the recordfs clear on 
that. 
MR, MCKAY: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I had no indication until this 
morning that there was even an issue concerning the test, and 
at that time there was some discussion in a chambers about 
the nature of the test. But my understanding is from what 
was discussed in chambers is that the defendant was stopped 
for a traffic violation, and I think as I recall, he pulled 
out onto the road, made a wide turn and the officer followed 
him for some distance with his light on, got up by Adams and 
25th, was it, somewhere? 
MR, MCKAY: Twenty-sixth (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Somewhere around Adams. And that the 
stop then took place after the officer forced him off the 
road in a snow storm, so that's all I saw. And I denied your 
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taken or Mr. Cornejo was asked to lift his arm he lift his 
arm and they drew the blood. He wasn't physically struggling 
but he had objected to giving a test. Is that a correct 
summary of then what happened? 
MS. BEATON: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. MCKAY: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. And also Ms. Beaton gave to 
the defense attorney the vitae of the blood technician 
showing that she considered his proper qualifications to draw 
blood and then to have it examined, and the testing 
procedures, she had already given information to the defense 
about what she was going to do in that regard, is that 
correct, Mr. McKay? 
MR. MCKAY: You know, I don't recall receiving a 
curriculum vitae but she did send to me the procedures that 
they follow. 
THE COURT: And you're not arguing that --
MR. MCKAY: That she wasn't qualified, no, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: — that the technician wasn't qualified? 
MR. MCKAY: No. 
THE COURT: And Ms. Beaton, what other information 
was given to the defense so we make a good record here about 
your intent to try and show — or to get the blood test in? 
What else did you do? You sent the curriculum vitae of the 
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the officers that were involved and you were attempting to 
attack the credibility of the officers because of the way 
they conducted themselves toward your client, is that a fair 
summary? 
MR. MCKAY: That's correct, your Honor. As well as 
the violations of their own procedures. 
THE COURT: So you were using it as a strategy to 
show that aspect as well as objecting to the admissibility? 
MR. MCKAY: Correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And the reason you did not file a motion 
to suppress this evidence was because it was part of your 
strategy — 
MR. MCKAY: That!s correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: — in doing that? 
MR. MCKAY: Right. Just do it during the trial. 
THE COURT: State have anything further you want to 
say that you haven1t said already? 
MS. BEATON: I guess the state's position is then, 
defense counsel can have all sorts of strategies if they 
want, but if they want to actually have this Court suppress 
evidence, it is required by Rule 12 that I actually receive 
five days prior to trial written notice of that motion. That 
would have given all of us, if we would have had five days 
notice, an opportunity to have researched the issue and 
prepared to have even argued it this morning. 
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factual findings as to why the Court does not believe the 
Rule 12 would apply in this case because the word "shall" is 
used --
THE COURT: Well, it's a constitutional violation of 
the defendant's rights in a DUI case possibly, although I 
haven't fully researched it myself and would be prepared to 
rule on that within an hour or so, but it just comes to my 
mind that there's certainly a constitutional issue of due 
process and self-incrimination -- or involuntary 
incrimination when a defendant has a right to refuse to give 
a blood test in a DUI case and suffer certain consequences as 
a result of that because the procedures are established on 
how it is to be done. But again, that is what initially 
comes to my mind about this at least addressing the 
constitutional questions of a defendant's right to due 
process and the incrimination against his own desires similar 
to any other incrimination. 
For example, I — I read the law as being different in a 
DUI case than someone who is convicted of a crime who has to 
give a test for DNA samples because there are statutory 
provisions governing the one and the other as well. I think 
there are statutory provisions on voluntary testing in DUI 
cases, and the exception would have to be persuasive, you 
know, for any court I think to allow it in. And your 
argument is that you think that it's still admissible even 
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anybody that's been a prosecutor or a defense attorney runs 
into these kinds of things and so itfs certainly not a fault 
issue. 
It's a matter of I've got a jury here ready to try the 
case, we've got a defendant here ready to be tried, he's got 
a right to have a speedy, public trial and this date was the 
date set for a trial and both sides have to come prepared. 
And this is an issue that based on -- I can see where your 
assumption came from, it turned out to not be a correct 
assumption because of Mr. McKay's not raising it before — 
MS. BEATON: Well, I mean he said --
THE COURT: — and you assumed that he had the 
burden to raise it and I'm saying, no, he can object to it at 
trial. That's really where that problem arises. 
MS. BEATON: But I think even when we were back in 
chambers talking about this we were having a difficult time 
trying to determine from Mr. McKay whether or not he was even 
objecting to the admissibility when he had to --
THE COURT: He could be silent about it even, you 
know. He doesn't have that burden. That's one of the things 
about the defense's position is they have many more options 
than I think the prosecution does, I really -- you know, and 
that sometimes may lead to some unfairness. 
MS. BEATON: But there are limits as to what he can 
do. 
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charge, a third degree felony, that has nothing to do with 
the DUI; there is no insurance charge, which has nothing to 
do with the DUI; and there is a driving on a revoked license, 
a Class B, which has nothing to do with the DUI. And I doubt 
that you want to dismiss those knowing that they would be 
dismissed with prejudice, because we could go ahead with 
those issues before the jury. 
MS. BEATON: Well, your Honor, with — the state's 
position is, is that the state has the ability as part of 
executive branch to brings charges and to dismiss charges. 
If this was a situation where it appeared to the Court that 
the state was doing this just to violate the defendant's 
speedy trial rights, then perhaps that would be a basis for 
the Court to dismiss. 
THE COURT: No, that's not — that's not the issue. 
MS. BEATON: So the state's position is, is that the 
state has not asked for a continuance of this trial. The 
state is prepared to go but the state now has an issue that 
it does not feel like it's prepared to present at this point. 
There is an alternative trial date that has already been 
set because there was going to be a scheduling problem 
already. This is the first time this case has actually been 
set for trial and this defendant is not in custody, so we're 
not dealing with speedy trial issues involving this defendant 
or the state's desire to delay. Because as the Court has 
faui i) nit M* nfa / 
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because we could try that and I'm not certain that the DUI 
would necessarily be barred based on the fact that it's the 
Court that is telling --
MS. BEATON: It would violate double jeopardy if it 
came back. 
THE COURT: — you to go ahead to -- well, the 
jury -- no, the jury has not been empaneled yet. 
MS. BEATON: But if we empanel the jury and I try 
the evading, the driving on suspension and the no insurance 
and we reserve the issue on the DUI and I move to dismiss the 
DUI and for some reason the Court of Appeals agrees and they 
return the DUI back to this Court, I would be precluded from 
trying the DUI. 
THE COURT: Not necessarily. So what do you want to 
D'Oottiot/cm oof if* Hofj do? 
fes . BEATON: State moves to dismiss 
THE COURT: All of the charges? 
MS. BEATON: Right. (Unintelligible.) 
THE COURT: You understand that this case with all 
four counts, if I dismiss I feel I have to dismiss them with 
prejudice because the defense is ready to proceed on them and 
the reasons for the continuance are not justifiable. 
MS. BEATON: By they have to amount to 
unconstitutional delay — 
THE COURT: That's in essence what you're doing is 
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All right. Then these charges are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
(The matter concluded.) 
